Reducing Unemployment. At any Cost? by Zilibotti, F.
CENTRE DE RECERCA
EN ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL
Reducing
Unemployment.
At any Cost?
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Els Opuscles del CREI
num. 2
december 971
Reducing 
Unemployment.
At any cost?
Fabrizio Zilibotti*
Introduction
If an economist were to comment in the early
70’s on the post-war economic performance of
Western Europe and the United States, he may
have put forward the following story.
“Production in Europe has grown faster than in
the United States because the Old Continent was
recovering from a large scale shock, the World
War II, which had destroyed a large share of its
stock of physical capital. The United States, inste-
ad, did not suffer a comparable destruction of
their productive capacity. This convergence effect
-as growth economists call it- is the main expla-
nation of the slower growth of the US during the
third quarter of the XXth Century. High invest-
ments and fast growth foster the demand for
labor, and this explains why unemployment rate
in Europe (2-3%) has been lower than in the US
(4-5%) in the post-war period”. Convergence
effects are transitory, and a reasonable forecast
for the last quarter of the century would have
been that in Europe growth would slowdown,
and unemployment rise up to the 4-5% rate
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fair degree of prosperity and social justice for
decades, without causing high unemployment.
The policy which they typically advocate is yet
another legislative intervention aimed at reducing
the weekly hours worked by each employee -a
proposal which, as far as its effects on employ-
ment are concerned, is regarded with skepticism
by most economists. To the opposite extreme,
Welfare State-skeptics regard European labor mar-
ket institutions as an irrational superstructure
which prevents the market from doing its job, thus
keeping unemployment high. Their analysis leads
to radical remedies: “free labor markets from any
regulation, go flexible, dispense with the Welfare
State”. This position has gained a growing credit
in the political debate.
The reflection which we will carry on in this
article does not intend to take a stake in this con-
test. Our purpose is, rather, to provide a balanced
assessment of the recent history based on a theo-
retical methodology which has proved to be very
fruitful in addressing many issues in labor econo-
mics, the search approach. The result which we
want to stress is that there exists no painless pana-
cea, and whatever way a society decides to go, it
will be confronted with unpleasant trade-offs. Our
research is motivated by two observations. The
first, often neglected by the Welfare State-skeptics,
is that not all records of the “flexible” American
labor market are positive: there are lights (low
unemployment) but also shadows (increasing
wage inequality, low productivity growth). The
second, typically eluded by the Welfare State-ent-
husiasts, is that the economic conditions have
changed irreversibly after the 70’s, and it would
self-deceptive to hope that the Golden Age in
which Welfare State and full employment were
mutually compatible can be restored.
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experienced by the United States in the post-war
period. 
The reality turned out to be much more bitter
than this prophecy. European unemployment
went up, first moderately after the first Oil Shock,
then abruptly between 1977 and 1985.
Employment has never stably recovered, thereaf-
ter, and currently unemployment rates in Europe
fluctuate around levels of the order of 11-12%.
The experiences of different European countries
are not homogeneous (see Marimon, 1997;
Marimon and Zilibotti, 1997b).To one extreme,
Spain went through a rapid increase of unemploy-
ment from 2.6% in 1973 to over 20% in the mid
80’s, and its most recent figure remains above
22%. To the other extreme, Portugal, Sweden and
Finland remained immune to the growing unem-
ployment epidemic throughout the 70’s and 80’s,
although the performance of the two Scandinavian
countries (especially Finland) has also deteriorated
in the 90’s. Leaving aside these differences, the
persistence of high unemployment seems to be
the central issue of Western Europe at the turn of
the century. During the same period, unemploy-
ment exhibited no trend in the United States.
Unlike their opinion for the first postwar decades,
economists have divided positions about what the
sources of these diverging experiences are. There
is no simple and uncontroverted theory which
explains why the fourth quarter of this century has
been so dramatically different from the previous
one, and a variety of theories, often implying con-
flicting prescriptions, have proliferated.
The comparison of the recent experience on
the two sides of the Ocean has originated an
intense political debate, too. On the one extreme,
strenuous defenders of the European way of life
deny that the rise of unemployment calls for ret-
hinking and reforming the Welfare State. Theirpublished on the Harvard Business Review. If in
Europe the main social and political concern has
been increasing unemployment, in the US it has
been rising inequality, which has produced the so-
called class of working-poor.
The increase in wage inequality observed
during the two last decades is the main source of
this new poverty (see Levy and Murnane, 1992;
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). The data show
that wage inequality was already higher in the
United States than in all major European countries
during the late 60’s (except for France), and that
the gap has increased significantly over the last
twenty years. From 1970 to the early 90’s, wage
inequality has increased continuously in the US,
while in France, Italy and Sweden inequality has
not increased. Great Britain has had decreasing
wage inequality in the 70’s and increasing wage
inequality in the 80’s. In the article cited above,
Freeman reports that “... in Western Europe, a
male worker in the bottom 10% of the earnings
distribution earns 68% of the median’s worker
income; in Japan, that male worker earns 61% of
the median. In the United States, he earns 38% of
the median... Low-paid German workers earn 2.2
times more than low paid Americans...” (p.116).
A further interesting feature of the data is that
wage inequality has been increasing not only bet-
ween groups but also within groups. In plain words,
not only the wage differential between workers of
different attributes or qualifications (e.g. college-
graduates vs. high-school graduates, experienced
vs. inexperienced workers), but also between wor-
kers of identical characteristics have grown in the
US but not in Europe. The growing inequality bet-
ween equally qualified workers in the US is even
more puzzling than the observation that the relative
wage of unskilled workers has dramatically fallen.
We will come back to this point.
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We stress in particular the role of one institu-
tion, unemployment benefit insurance, which can
be regarded as representative of a variety of
Welfare State policies. The conclusions of our
work are in agreement with the Welfare State-
skeptics’ view that unemployment insurance has
been a key factor in determining the increase of
unemployment in Europe. But our analysis also
warns about the undesirable implications on the
wage (and income) inequality and, possibly, on
economic efficiency which would arise by dispen-
sing with unemployment benefits. The net effects
on social welfare of switching from a Welfare State
to a pure laissez-faire system can go either way
(or, in economists’ terms, are in general ambi-
guous). Choosing between the “American” and the
“European” option is therefore much more a mat-
ter of social preferences between conflicting
objectives than a choice between a rational
modern market-oriented society and obsolete irra-
tional institutions, as Welfare State-skeptics often
argue. Keeping the Welfare State alive at the turn
of the century may have the cost of accepting
substantially higher unemployment levels than in
the past, of the order of 8-10%. But the cost of
dismantling this system should not be underesti-
mated, either, as the recent experience of the
United States clearly shows.
The dark side of the US
experience
“ Rising inequality. Stagnant real wages. A
declining middle class. High levels of child poverty.
A waning union movement. Homeless people in
every city. Bursting jails or prisons. A fraying
social safety net.” This description of the changes
in the American society during the last two deca-
des is not drawn from a Marxist pamphlet, but is
the beginning of an article by R.B. Freeman (1996)There is another dimension in which the US
performance is disappointing: productivity growth.
The growing unemployment gap notwithstanding,
total GDP growth in Europe has been fairly similar
to that of the US in the last 25 years. In the period
1975-93 the GDP growth rate of the US has been
2.6% per year, about the same as that of Germany
(2.5%), France (2.4%), Italy (2.8%) and Spain
(2.5%), only significantly higher than the United
Kingdom’s (1.9%). The two facts, different
employment rates and similar growth rates, imply
large differences in productivity growth: in the
period 1975-94 the average growth rate of output
per worker in Western Europe has been one per-
cent above the US rate. While it is true that this
gap in favor of Europe also existed in the 60’s, it
is hard to believe that in the 90’s we still observe
significant catch-up effects associated with the
post-war recovery. A recent article on the
Economist (May 1996) suggests the following
explanation. “Weak unions and low minimum
wages have allowed real wages at the bottom to
fall. This, in turn, means that American compa-
nies hire relatively more (cheaper) workers than
their European counterpart. Hence the average
American restaurant has more waiters and table-
clearers than its European equivalent...”
If lower productivity growth simply reflected
the fact that for each cheap (and low-productivity)
job which is created in the US, Europe has one
additional unit of unemployment, the balance
would certainly be in favor of the flexible market
options. But this view has been questioned from
both a theoretical and empirical standpoint.
Acemoglu (1997) finds support to the hypothesis
that “good”’ and “bad” jobs are to some extent
substitutes of each other. In plain words, this
means that economies where “cheap jobs” are not
profitable (because of high minimum wages or
unemployment benefits) tend to generate a larger
7
Freeman expresses a concern for a waning
union movement in the United States. This con-
cern would probably not be shared by a number
of analysts of the European unemployment issue.
A common view is that the main responsibility of
the persistence of high unemployment in Europe
lies precisely in the selfish and corporative attitude
of the unions. Unions only care -it is argued-
about the interest of their employed affiliates.
Their activity keeps wages artificially high, preven-
ting the market from absorbing the mass of unem-
ployed. A diminishing power of unions would
therefore be welcome as reducing the privileges
of the insiders (employed workers) in favor of the
unprotected outsiders (unemployed workers). But
are the perspectives of a jobless worker really less
dim in economies with weak unions, like the
United States, than in economies with powerful
unions, like Europe, as this common view would
suggest? On the one hand, it is true that in the
United States unemployment is on average a
much more transitory experience than in Europe.
In 1989 more than half of the unemployed in
Europe could not find a job after one year unem-
ployed, against less than 10% in the United States.
Yet, it is less than clear that a typical American
unemployed face a better future than her
European counterpart. First, the financial hardship
of living without a salary is mitigated in most
European countries by more generous unemploy-
ment benefit legislations. Second, the typical job
which the European worker eventually takes is on
average better-paid and more stable than the one
taken by the American worker, who often move
from a precarious job into another. Overall, there
is no evidence that the lifetime labor market expe-
rience of a typical American unemployed is any
better than that of his European counterpart (see
CEPR Report, 1995, p. 13). Freeman’s alarm for
the decline of the American union movement may
therefore be well-motivated.
6ve goods (e.g. textiles) in Developed Countries
and the consequent fall in the demand of unski-
lled workers has depressed the wages of these
workers. In the United States this has originated
increasing wage inequality. In Europe, where the
action of trade unions keeps the range of wages
artificially compressed, we have seen growing
unemployment of low-skilled workers. This sim-
ple and elegant explanation has two important
drawbacks. First, it can only account for rising
wage inequality among workers with heterogene-
ous characteristics (the skilled vs. the unskilled),
while as we discussed above inequality has also
increased within workers with identical characte-
ristics. Second, this explanation suggests that
unemployment in Europe should be more con-
centrated among unskilled workers than in the
US. But this is in contradiction with the evidence
that the unskilled-to-skilled unemployment ratio is
about the same in Europe and in the US.
Moreover, skilled unemployment has grown in
Europe, too, while the theory would suggest the
opposite.
Krusell et al. (1997) argue, instead, that an
important feature of recent growth in developed
economies is a rapid fall in the cost of using capi-
tal equipment, and postulate that low-skill wor-
kers are better substitutes for capital than high-
skill workers. These two facts -declining price of
capital and capital skill complementarity- has
induced firms to switch towards techniques which
are intensive in capital and in skilled workers,
decreased the demand of unskilled workers and
increased the skill premium. Although the mecha-
nism proposed by these authors is different and
supported by sounder empirical evidence, the
explanation provided by this theory shares most
of the implications (and criticism) of the “trade”
approach.
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number not only of unemployed, but also of high
pay, high productivity jobs. The author tests this
hypothesis comparing data across American States
(from the Current Population Survey), and the
conclusion is that minimum wages and unemploy-
ment benefits may increase unemployment but
also improve the composition of jobs substantially.
Although no similar empirical investigation has
been carried on with European data, the same
author stresses that the indirect evidence from dif-
ferences in productivity growth suggests that the
same trade-off may well explain the differences
between Europe and the United States: “on the
one hand, the society may choose high employ-
ment, but also a high proportion of low pay jobs
and low labor productivity; on the other it may opt
for an equilibrium with more good jobs, high pro-
ductivity but also higher unemployment”’ (p. 3)1. 
The irreversible end of the
Golden Age
A number of economic theories -supported to
various extent by empirical evidence- argue that
the economic environment since the late 70’s
went through a transformation which has chan-
ged the impact of Welfare State institutions on
unemployment. A popular view in the recent eco-
nomic literature is that the evolution of internatio-
nal trade, in particular the increasing flow of
manufacturing exports from developing countries
into OECD markets has hurt low-skilled workers
in developed economies (see Krugman, 1994;
Freeman, 1995). The flow of labor-intensive
manufactured goods from Least Developed
Countries into Western markets has been equiva-
lent to a large-scale immigration of unskilled wor-
kers from less developed to developed countries.
Foreign competition -this theory says- has made
stagnant the production of unskilled labor-intensi-
8remarkably well, as we will see, the observed
patterns.
We focus in particular on the role of unem-
ployment insurance. Although this institution
exists in both Europe and the United States, there
are important differences in both levels and set-
up. In Europe, typically an unemployed worker
receives periodically a cash payment financed by
general revenue. Both the duration and coverage
vary across European countries. In the US there
are important differences between State and State.
But there is general agreement that unemployment
insurance is substantially more generous in
Europe than in the United States. 
There are economic arguments both in favor
and against unemployment benefits. The criticism
to this institution is twofold. First, unemployment
benefits distort workers’ incentives to seek
employment: the transfer makes unemployed wor-
kers reduce the time and intensity devoted to
searching for a job. Second, they increase the
minimum wages at which the unemployed wor-
kers are willing to take employment. Both effects
raise unemployment.3 On the other hand, unem-
ployment benefits are defended on the ground
that they provide workers with valuable social
insurance against the risk of experiencing unem-
ployment spells during which they receive no
labor income. Beyond the insurance motives,
unemployment benefits are argued to reduce mis-
match. In other words, they provide the necessary
safety net to give time to the unemployed to
search, not just for a job, but for the right job.
While often heard in the political debate, this
point has never been thoroughly considered by
the economic literature which has attempted to
explain the various pieces (unemployment, wage
inequality, productivity) of the Europe vs. US
puzzle. This is precisely the focus of our work.
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Although the causes and nature of the change
occurred are still open to debate, economists tend
to agree that the environment of the 90’s is funda-
mentally different from that of the 60’s, and that res-
toring the Golden Age of the Welfare State through
renewed forms of public intervention is bound to
fail. Any realistic policy proposal for the beginning
of the XXI century has to confront trade-offs which
are substantially different from those faced by
European economies in the 60’s.
A new theory:
unemployment vs. mismatch
As we have indicated earlier, it is common to
associate the different performance of US and
European labor markets with differences in mar-
ket flexibility. The degree of flexibility is typically
defined by a number of institutional features of
the labor market, like the hiring and firing regula-
tions, the degree of centralization of bargaining
procedure and unionization, the extent to which
contracts signed by unions bind, etc. Although
understanding and quantifying the effects of these
institutions may be important, we believe that the
economic literature has somewhat exaggerated
the extent of the institutional differences between
the European and the Northamerican labor mar-
kets. This has contributed to the spread of the
preconceptional view that European labor rela-
tions are the realm of sclerosis, in contrasts with
frictionless and well-functioning American labor
markets.2 In some recent work (Marimon and
Zilibotti, 1997a), we have explored the hypothesis
that large differences in outcomes may have been
generated by a relatively small degree of institu-
tional differences, and tried to explain the events
of the last two decades through the filter of a
common theoretical model for both Europe and
the US. The predictions of our theory match
10employment. A worker who performs tasks which
are “suitable” to her qualification has a higher pro-
ductivity, and earns a higher wage. In a competiti-
ve labor market where workers and firms can be
matched instantaneously at no cost, this would
just imply that all agents take employment with
their ideal firm. However, this perfect match bet-
ween workers and firms does not occur in our
labor market, since -due to search frictions- it
takes time before a particular worker and a parti-
cular firm offering a vacancy happen to be mat-
ched to each other. And waiting has a cost. For
firms, because they have to pay recruiting costs
while holding an unfilled vacancy. For workers,
because they do not earn a wage while unemplo-
yed. Since finding a job is both time and resource-
consuming, matches which are not the most pro-
ductive given the characteristics of worker and
firms are normally formed.4
Assume now that labor markets have become
more “segmented” and that it is more important
today than in the 60’s to have a job consistent
with one’s qualification. In the United States, since
unemployment insurance is very low, workers
find it very costly to be unemployed, and conti-
nue to accept a large range of job offers, even
when these imply very low salaries. Since the pro-
ductivity gap between good and bad jobs has
now grown for technological reasons, the extent
of wage inequality -even between workers with
identical qualifications- goes up in the more seg-
mented low-insurance economy. In the econo-
mists’ jargon, technological change amplifies the
effects of mismatch on earnings. Since workers
keep accepting “any job”, the unemployment rate
undergoes no major change. In Europe, instead,
since unemployment insurance is more generous
and mitigates the hardship of being “on the dole”,
workers can afford to change their search beha-
vior and adapt it to the change of the economic
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Let us start from a basic question: who is an
unemployed in a modern economy? Unemployed
is a person in working age who is searching for
but has not found yet a job which fits her aspira-
tions. Apart from historical and cultural connota-
tions, this aspiration level depends on a variety of
legal and social institutions. If, for instance an
unemployed receives the support of her family or
community, she can afford to be more ambitious
in aiming at a certain type of occupation than if
she is threatened by homelessness and starvation.
To put an extreme example, suppose that a
government made it liable to prosecution being
unemployed for more than one month. If politi-
cally sustainable, this policy is likely to reduce
substantially unemployment, but at the potentially
very high social cost of inducing many people to
take by necessity very unsuitable job matches -
many Ph.D. in computer science would be emplo-
yed as waiters! This link between unemployment
and mismatch has been recognized, for example,
by Solow (1987), who suggests that we should
count as (involuntarily) unemployed all agents
whose ‘marginal value of leisure is less than the
going real wage in occupations for which they are
qualified’, a definition which ‘covers both the ski-
lled mechanic who does not take work as a swee-
per and the one who does’ (p. 33).
In order to formally analyze the trade-off bet-
ween unemployment and mismatch, in Marimon
and Zilibotti (1997a) we construct a theoretical
model in which the process of matching workers
with firms is costly: firms invest significant resour-
ces in recruitment, workers spend time end
energy in reading announcements, attending inter-
views, etc.. In other words, a very important featu-
re of the labor market is the existence of search
frictions. Second, we make the realistic assump-
tion that a worker has a different productivity
depending on the firm with which he takes
12ting procedure is not viable (for lack of statistical
information or because the structure of the theore-
tical model is too complicated...). An alternative
technique to empirically assess the predictive
power of the theory consists of solving numeri-
cally a calibrated version of the model, and com-
pare the results with the empirical evidence. The
qualification that the model is calibrated means
that the economist assigns a priori “reasonable
values” to a number of exogenous parameters of
the model (for example, those describing the pro-
ductive technology), in such a way that they are
consistent with independent estimates obtained
from other works. The model is then simulated,
and a number of statistics of interest are computed
for the model economy, and compared with the
corresponding real figures. The extent to which
these statistics are close to each others determines
the success or failure of the theory. This technique
was also adopted to provide an empirical assess-
ment of our theory. 
In particular, in Marimon and Zilibotti (1997a)
we construct two model economies which only
differ by the extent of the unemployment insuran-
ce. One economy, LF, is assumed to provide no
unemployment insurance, and is interpreted as a
stylized US-type Laissez-Faire economy. The other
economy, WS, can be thought as a typical Welfare
State-oriented European country, and has a stan-
dard system of benefit provision of unlimited
duration (of the order of 50% of the wage of a
low-paid worker). The two economies are identi-
cal in all other respects. 
We then proceed to change the economic
environment, by letting a common shock hit both
economies. To be specific, we increase the pro-
ductivity differentials between jobs for which a
worker is suitable and jobs for which he is not.5
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environment. In this more segmented high-insu-
rance economy the unemployed accept now only
jobs for which they are relatively better-qualified
than they did before, and reject poor opportuni-
ties which would yield them a low wage. Since
job-seekers are more selective and bad matches
are not formed, this economy does not have
“poor workers” nor wage inequality changes subs-
tantially. To say it again in the economists’ jargon,
the endogenous change of the workers’ acceptance
cut-off offsets the inequalizing effects of technologi-
cal change. But precisely because workers are
choosier, in this high-insurance economy each
unemployed searches for longer before finding the
right opportunity, and the unemployment rate the-
refore grows. 
In summary: two similar economies but with
(slightly) different institutions react very different
to a global technical change. These different reac-
tions are consistent with the contrasting observed
trajectories of Europe and the United States which
have been discussed earlier. They are also consis-
tent with the observation that the average produc-
tivity of labor has grown faster in Europe than in
the US: this would be due to the fact that in the
former there is less mismatch than in the latter.
Testing the quantitative
predictions of our theory
The traditional procedure to test the validity of
an economic theory consists of applying econo-
metric techniques (e.g. regressions) to the data to
estimate the relationships between the variables of
interest predicted by the theoretical model. If the
estimated parameters have the sign predicted by
the model, and are quantitatively significant, then
the theory is regarded as empirically validated.
Otherwise, it is rejected. In many cases, this tes-
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The simulated time evolution of the two key
variable, unemployment and output, is reported in
Figure 1 and 2, respectively (n.b.: the time unit
corresponds to a quarter). In LF (lower trajectory),
unemployment remains approximately constant,
whereas in WS (upper trajectory) the unemploy-
ment rate rapidly grows and settles down at the
new higher long-run level. As far as the evolution
of GNP is concerned (Figure 2), the two econo-
mies start from very similar levels, and WS (trajec-
tory which first decreases and then increases) rea-
ches some higher GNP level at the new long-run
level. However, the cost of this better long-run
performance is a sharp initial recession. The GNP
in WS remains below that of LF (trajectory which
always increases) for about ten years. Twenty
years after the shock, all variables in both econo-
mies are very close to their respective long-run
values.
Some statistics for the initial (the 60’s) and final
(the 90’s) situation of the two simulated econo-
mies are reported in Table 1. In the initial period,
when all workers accept a wide range of jobs in
both economies, the average duration of unem-
ployment is about four months in LF, and 5.5
months in WS. The wage distribution is very simi-
lar in the two countries, and so are output and
productivity. Note that total output is initially
slightly larger in LF than in WS. Twenty years
after, the contrast is much sharper. The unemploy-
ment rate remains almost the same in LF (3.8%),
where workers continue to accept a large range of
jobs, but increases substantially in WS (11%),
where workers switch to a more selective job
search strategy. These figures are rather close to
the real data of the United States and Europe (ca.
4.5% and 11%, respectively). The average duration
of unemployment remains constant in the laissez-
faire economy, while it doubles in the welfare-
state economy. The share of long-term unemplo-
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yed grows substantially in WS, where about half
of the unemployed workers has to wait for more
than six months before finding an acceptable job,
while 23% has to wait for more than a year. The
same share does not change in LF. This different
responses of the average duration of unemploy-
ment and share of long-term unemployment are
also broadly consistent with the patterns observed
in the reality.6
Although workers experience longer unem-
ployment spells in the welfare state economy,
they are assigned more efficiently to jobs. This is
reflected in productivity growth, which is about
1% per year in LF, while it is 1.5% in WS. The pro-
ductivity gap is of almost half point percentage
per year. The gap between productivity growth in
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Table1. Comparison between the two model
economies.
the 60’s the 90’s % change
Unemployment rate LF 3.9 3.8
WS 5.4 11.0
Average duration of LF 3.9 3.9
unemployment (months) WS 5.4 11
Average productivity LF 2.05 2.56 22.3
per employed WS 2.07 2.81 30.6
GNP LF 1.97 46 22.4
WS 1.96 2.51 24.6
Percentage of unemployed LF 13.1 12.5
with spell ≥ 6 months WS 22.9 48.2
Percentage of unemployed LF 13.1 12.5
with spell ≥ 12 months WS 5.3 23.2
Percentage diff. LF 12.0 19.3 7.3
highest-lowest wage WS 14.8 16.3 1.5
Percentage diff. LF 9.7 15.8 6.1
90th-10th wage percentile WS 9.6 13 3.4Winners and loosers
In Marimon and Zilibotti (1997a), we also
address some questions concerning the distribu-
tion of welfare gains under alternative policy regi-
mes. The following exercise yields some particu-
larly insightful results. Take the Welfare State-
oriented economy in the 70’s and let the techno-
logy shock hit it. As we have seen, the after-shock
evolution of the economy (as in figures 1 and 2)
depends on the extent of unemployment insuran-
ce. Imagine that all agents can rationally forecast
the evolution of the economy under the alternati-
ve policy regimes. Would they prefer to preserve
or to abolish the unemployment benefits system
when the shock occurs? In our work we show for-
mally the intuitive result that the agents’ preferen-
ces will not be unanimous with respect to this
issue. The choice of each individual will generally
depend on her individual status (unemployed,
employed with a good job, employed with a bad
job, etc.) at the moment in which she is called to
decide.7 In general, the Welfare State option recei-
ves the support of the unemployed and the “poor
workers” and the opposition of the “rich workers”.
The question which we have asked is then: given
this conflict of interest, which share of the popula-
tion would have opted for preserving the Welfare
State immediately after the shock? According to
our simulations, about 54% of the employed wor-
kers, together with all the unemployed (about 5%
of the workforce), would have preferred to main-
tain the provision of benefits rather than abolis-
hing it.
The finding that a majority of the workers
would have supported the Welfare State is per se
interesting, although we grant that the quantitative
extent of the support may vary if we change some
features of the model. But the findings enlightens
a more general point. A great deal of the econo-
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the US and in Europe is about 1.1% per year, so
the model correctly predicts the sign of the diffe-
rence although it only accounts for half of the
observed difference. Note, additionally, that total
GNP growth is larger in WS than in LF.
Remarkably, in this numerical simulation, the eco-
nomy with 11% unemployment rate is more pro-
ductive than the economy with 3.8% unemploy-
ment rate. The size of the mismatch effect is quite
large.
Table 1 also shows that the model correctly
predicts the qualitative changes in wage inequa-
lity, although the quantitative effects predicted are
fairly small. Wage inequality increases more in the
economy without unemployment insurance than
in the one with insurance, and this is true for both
the ratio between the highest and lowest wage
and the ratio between the 90th and the 10th per-
centile. The explanation of this difference is that
while in LF many workers accept jobs which are
highly unsuitable to their characteristics, and the-
refore receive a low wage, in WS poor matches
are rejected. This shrinks the wage distribution.
Thus, although the nature of technical change is
intrinsically unequalizing, this is almost entirely
offset by the changing attitude of job seekers in
the welfare state economy. In the country with no
insurance, instead, the wider productivity gap is
entirely passed through to increasing wage ine-
quality between the lucky agents who have found
good matches and the unlucky ones who have
found bad matches.
20Conclusions
The performance of Western European and
North American labor market has been very diffe-
rent throughout the last quarter of century. If
Europe has experienced a large boom of unem-
ployment, the United States have suffered with a
substantial increase of wage inequality and
poverty. Both phenomena have raised substantial
social concern. In this article we have argued on
the basis of the result of our previous investiga-
tion that the two issues are deeply interlinked and
originate from the same change in the world eco-
nomic environment. We attribute the different res-
ponses observed on the two sides of the Ocean to
the different extent and pervasiveness of Welfare
State institutions, in particular unemployment insu-
rance.
On the basis of the results of our research, we
have come to question the widespread view that
the virtuous performance of the US labor market
in keeping unemployment low indicates unambi-
guously to European governments the way to
fight unemployment. There are no easy receipts to
bring the European unemployment back to the
levels of the 60’s without raising other difficult
problems. All projects of reform of the Welfare
State which are currently under discussion in
Europe should be accompanied by full awareness
of all relevant trade-offs. In particular, targeting
unemployment rates without considering other
aspects (mismatch, wage inequality) may be the
wrong guideline, if the reformer aims, as she
should, at improving the social welfare.
The political economy of the reforms should
also be more carefully considered. Reducing the
provision of unemployment insurance has effects
not only on the efficiency of the labor market
(effects whose direction is, as we have seen,
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mists’ recommendations about reforming the
Welfare State has been so far based on the predic-
tions of aggregate macroeconomic models. But
these reforms entail important distributional
effects: reducing unemployment insurance would
benefit some social groups while harming others.
Understanding better the distributional implica-
tions, as well as the so-called political economy of
the Welfare State -i.e which political majorities or
social coalitions support some institutions or block
their reform- is at least as important as assessing
the effects of these institutions on economic per-
formance.
22Footnotes
* This article was written in September 1997 and comes from
research carried on within the framework of CREI. The first part
of this research has analyzed in detail the difference between
the labor market experiences of ten European Countries. The
findings of this work are summarized in the first Opuscle del
CREI, Marimon (1997), and discussed in more detail in
Marimon and Zilibotti (1997b). The second part of this project,
has focused on the contrasting experience of the labor markets
in Europe and the US over the last twenty years, and is discus-
sed in this Opuscle. A more detailed and technical account of
the issues discussed in this article can be found in Marimon
and Zilibotti (1997a) on which this work is largely based. The
results of all parts of the project are the fruit of a collaboration
with Ramon Marimon, and indeed this article has benefited
substantially from long discussion together. I wish also to thank
Andreu Mas-Colell and María Sáez Martí for their comments.
All remaining errors are my responsibility.
(1) Furthermore, in the model presented by this author, an
unregulated economy produces always an inefficiently too high
proportion of bad-to-good jobs. In this world, labor market
regulation has a rationale.
(2) Our view is echoed by the recent CEPR Report (1997) on
European unemployment, which concludes that “... European
labor markets (...) seem to be a long way from the stagnant
and sclerotic form they are so often painted.” (p. 9).
(3) Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997) argue that the distortionary
effect on search incentives of benefit compensations in Europe
has been a crucial element to determine the boom of unemploy-
ment in the 80’s.
(4) As usual, the construction of a formal model forces to put
on some “blinkers”, namely to focus on some aspects and to
neglect others. Our analysis only considers some forms of hete-
rogeneity and mismatch, without considering others which may
be also very important in the real world. For instance, workers
typically differ by skill acquired through education, family
environment, firm training etc., while in our work each worker
simply is more suitable to some jobs than to some others. These
are all very important issues that should be considered and that
we plan to analyse and integrate in our future work.
(5) As explained above, the parameters of the model are cali-
brated to match some empirical observations. For instance, the
annual real interest implied by the parameter choice is 6%,
while the average duration of a job match is about six years.
Both economies have an underlying trend of labor productivity
of 1% per year. Given parameters, the two economies have ini-
tially -the early 70’s- fairly similar unemployment rates (5.4%
for the WS, 3.9% for the LF). In the initial period (the early 70’s)
each agent is 25% more productive in her best than in her
worst occupation. Then, as the episode of unexpected mismatch-
biased technological change occurs, this differential goes up to
45%.
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generally ambiguous), but also on income distri-
bution. If these effects are not offset by compen-
sating social policies in favor of the losers, the
reforms can encounter large scale social resistance
which can, in turn, threaten their viability. 
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